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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-HE SAID,
SHE SAID: GRAND JURY INDICTS BASED ON

HEARSAY IN FOURTEEN YEAR-OLD SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASE-COMMONWEALTH V
STEVENSON, 50 N.E.3D 184 (MASS. 2016).
Both the Supreme Court of the United States of America ("Supreme
Court") and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") have held
that hearsay testimony does not constitute grounds for dismissal of an
indictment, opining an indictment obtained using such testimony must
stand.' In the context of an indictment, the grand jury process protects
innocent citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions by determining
whether probable cause exists in order to indict the defendants. 2 In

1 See,

e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (affirming indictment solely on

hearsay evidence); Commonwealth v. Woodward, 32 N.E. 939, 940 (Mass. 1893) (noting
Massachusetts reverence for sanctity of grand jury in line with common law); Commonwealth v.
Walsh, 151 N.E. 300, 301 (Mass. 1926) (recognizing leeway granted to grand jury to interpret
evidence); Commonwealth v. Lammi, 37 N.E.2d 250, 254-55 (Mass. 1941) (admitting testimony
offered by co-defendants as sufficient to support indictment); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 333
N.E.2d 400, 404-06 (Mass. 1975) (upholding indictment based completely on hearsay);
Commonwealth v. McGahee, 473 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1985) (allowing police officers'
testimony of identification process in which defendant was selected); Commonwealth v. Club
Caravan, 571 N.E.2d 405,408 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (explaining minimum standards for upholding
indictment based on hearsay); Commonwealth v. Fort, 597 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 (Mass. App. Ct.
1992) (asserting hearsay sufficient from grand jury indictment); see also MASS. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)
("Indictment Based Upon Secondary Evidence. An indictment shall not be dismissed on the
grounds that the evidence presented before the grand jury consisted in whole or in part of the record
from the defendant's probable cause hearing or that other hearsay evidence was presented before
the grand jury.").
2 See Lataille v. Dist. Court of E. Hampden, 320 N.E.2d. 877, 882 (Mass. 1974) (explaining
dual function of grand jury); see also Commonwealth v. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50, 58-59 (Mass.
2002) (rendering testimony sufficient evidence to sustain grand jury indictment); MASS. CONST.
art. 12 (2016) (stating rights are firmly rooted and protected by Massachusetts Constitution).
[N]o subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and
plainly, substantially and formally, described to him; or be compelled to accuse, or
furnish evidence against himself. And every subject shall have a right to produce all
proofs, that may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and
to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his counsel at his election. And no subject
shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or
privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or
estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. And the legislature shall
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Commonwealth v. Stevenson,3 the SJC decided whether a criminal defendant
can be indicted in a grand jury proceeding based upon hearsay testimony
detailing sexual assaults that occurred many years in the past.4 The SJC
grappled with deciding whether obtaining an indictment using hearsay
testimony was an "extraordinary circumstance[] ... so pernicious [as to
require] dismissal of the indictment."5 Ultimately, the SJC held that the
grand jury can hear all information available to law enforcement at the time
of the proceedings concerning the sexual assaults in question, and therefore,
the decision to indict the defendant on such information was warranted. 6
not make any law, that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment,
excepting for the government of the army and navy, without trial by jury.
Id. This document provides the fundamental rights for all Massachusetts citizens. Id. The
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is the world's oldest, functioning, written
state constitution. See John Addams & the Massachusetts Constitution: Why Study the
Massachusetts Constitution, MASS.GOV (2017) http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/sjc/edures-center/jn-adams/mass-constitution-1-gen.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2016). The Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts served as a model for the United States Constitution that was
written in 1787. Id.
3 50 N.E.3d 184, 185 (Mass. 2016) (holding indictment brought years after alleged crimes not
"extraordinary circumstance" requiring dismissal based solely upon hearsay).
4 See id.at 189 (holding indictment brought years after alleged crimes not "extraordinary
circumstance" requiring dismissal based solely upon hearsay).
5 Id. at 188-90 (stating hearsay is acceptable unless it presents extraordinary circumstances).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 387 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Mass. 1979) (elaborating on
extraordinary circumstances in cases); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 430 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 n.5
(Mass. 1982) (establishing minimum sufficient evidence for grand jury to hear and determine
probable cause); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Mass. 1993) (relating video
testimony to hearsay which is acceptable to return indictments); Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 605
N.E.2d 852, 854 (Mass. 1993) (determining whether or not there was impairment of grand jury
proceedings); Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 466 N.E.2d 828, 831 n.1 (Mass. 1984) (noting direct
testimony is preferred but not required at grand jury proceedings).
6 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190 (recognizing special characteristics of sexual assault
charges). Stevenson was indicted with one count of aggravated rape of a child with force and five
counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. Id. See generally MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch.265, § 22B (2008) (defining Stevenson's one charge of aggravated rape of a child
with force).
[W]hoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a child under 16,
and compels such a child to submit by force and against his will or compels such child
to submit by threat of bodily injury and: (a) the sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual
intercourse is committed during the commission or attempted commission of any of the
following offenses: (1) armed burglary as set forth in section 14 of chapter 266; (2)
unarmed burglary as set forth in section 15 of said chapter 266; (3) breaking and entering
as set forth in section 16 of said chapter 266; (4) entering without breaking as set forth
in section 17 of said chapter 266; (5) breaking and entering into a dwelling house as set
forth in section 18 of said chapter 266; (6) kidnapping as set forth in section 26 of chapter
265; (7) armed robbery as set forth in section 17 of said chapter 265; (8) unarmed robbery
as set forth in section 19 of said chapter 265; (9) assault and battery with a dangerous
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On May 22, 2014, Detective Mark Santon of the Tisbury Police

Department was contacted to investigate a sexual assault case involving a
resident of West Tisbury, a small town in Massachusetts. 7 Detective Santon
interviewed the complainant, "Sarah," 8 about a series of sexual assaults that
began when she was ten years old, which she alleged were committed by the

weapon or assault with a dangerous weapon as set forth in sections 15A and 15B of said
chapter 265; (10) home invasion as set forth in section 18C of said chapter 265; or (11)
posing or exhibiting child in state of nudity or sexual conduct as set forth in section 29A
of chapter 272;
(b) the sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse results in, or is committed by
means of an act or acts resulting in, substantial bodily injury as defined in section 13J;
(c) the sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse is committed while the victim
is tied, bound or gagged;
(d) the sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse is committed after the
defendant administered, or caused to be administered, alcohol or a controlled substance
by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means to the victim without the victim's
consent;
(e) the sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse is committed by a joint
enterprise; or
(f) the sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse was committed in a manner in
which the victim could contract a sexually transmitted disease or infection of which the
defendant knew or should have known he was a carrier, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years, but not less than 15
years. The sentence imposed on such person shall not be reduced to less than 15 years,
or suspended, nor shall any person convicted under this section be eligible for probation,
parole, work release or furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence for good
conduct until he shall have served 15 years of such sentence. Prosecutions commenced
under this section shall neither be continued without a finding nor placed on file.
Id.; See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13B (2016) (explaining charge of indecent assault and battery
on a child under age fourteen).
Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 14 shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years, or by
imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 21 years. A prosecution
commenced under this section shall neither be continued without a finding nor placed
on file.
In a prosecution under this section, a child under the age of 14 years shall be deemed
incapable of consenting to any conduct of the defendant for which such defendant is
being prosecuted.
Id.
7 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 186. Detective Santon was contacted by a lieutenant with the
West Tisbury police department after the complainant's boyfriend reported the complainant had
been a victim of sexual assault years before his testimony. Id.
8 See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4 n.1, Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d 184
(Mass. 2016) (No. SJC-11962). Due to specific identifying infornation being disclosed in this case,
the Commonwealth referred to the victim as "Sarah" or "complainant," which is not her real name,
due to privacy concerns.
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defendant. 9 Sarah was hired by the defendant, Carlos Stevenson, and his
wife to provide childcare for their two toddler boys, irrespective of whether
the parents were home or not, from 2000 to 2003.10 Sarah reported instances
of sexual assault, as well as harassment that occurred while babysitting for
Stevenson, ranging from inappropriate comments to groping to forcible
digital rape." Sarah refrained from disclosing the alleged sexual assaults
until 2009, when a fellow classmate handed out an "anonymous sexual
assault on Martha's Vineyard survey," through which Sarah alleged she was
"molested by a neighbor since she was nine, she sees him every day ....12
In 2013, upon experiencing a panic attack when seeing Stevenson while
shopping with her then-boyfriend, Michael, Sarah finally revealed the sexual
assaults to her mother and father.' 3
On October 6, 2014, a grand jury received the case and Detective
Santon was the sole witness called to testify.14 Following Detective Santon's
testimony, the grand jury indicted Stevenson on one charge of aggravated
rape of a child with force, and five charges of indecent assault and battery on
a child under fourteen years old.' 5 Stevenson successfully filed a motion to
9 See id.(detailing Detective Stanton's interview of Sarah); see also Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at
186 (discussing results of Detective Stanton's investigation).
10 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 186 (outlining employer-employee relationship between
complainant and Stevenson). See also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 8,at 5 (describing
complainant's duties while employed by Stevenson). Sarah was deemed the "mother's helper"
because she babysat when the family was in and out of the home. Id.
" See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 186 (illustrating sexual assaults conducted on child at age ten);
see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 8, at 6-11 (explaining details of interview
conducted by Detective Santon). Complainant described to Detective Santon that Stevenson would
follow her throughout the home, slide his hands between her thighs or grope her buttocks, touch
her vagina over her clothes, and touch her undeveloped chest over her clothes on a regular basis at
the age of ten. Id. at 6. In the fall of 2001, Stevenson first showed his erect penis, while
masturbating, to Complainant and forced her to stroke his penis while his sons were in the next
room. Id. Stevenson, on multiple occasions, forced the complainant to touch him by threatening
her safety, or her family's safety. Id.at 8. Complainant stated this type of assault persisted for so
long that she could no longer account for the number of instances, and estimated that it could have
been hundreds of times. Id.
12 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 186 (revealing anonymous survey was first time complainant
discussed sexual assault); see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 8, at 13-14 (noting
when complainant first discussed her series of sexual assaults).
13 See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 8, at 4 n. 1. Due to specific identifying
information being disclosed in this case, the Commonwealth referred to the victim's boyfriend as
"Michael." Id. Sarah and Michael went inside a photo shop when Stevenson was standing
comfortably behind a female clerk. Id. at 14. Sarah almost had a panic attack at the thought that
there could be other victims, besides herself. Id. at 15. It was at that moment Sarah decided to tell
her mother and father, and about a week later she told Detective Santon. Id.
14 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 186 (discussing evidence presented at grand jury proceedings).
15 See id.
at 184-85 (detailing indictment of Stevenson's charges and recognizing grand jury
indictment). Stevenson was indicted with one charge of aggravated rape of a child with force and
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dismiss the indictments after his arraignment on grounds that the case
constituted an extraordinary circumstance, and that the indictment should not
be based solely on hearsay.' 6 The Commonwealth appealed the dismissal,
and the SJC granted Stevenson's application for direct appellate review to
decide whether or not an "extraordinary circumstance" applies when sexual
assault charges are brought many years after the alleged underlying crime

was committed, such that hearsay testimony is an unacceptable substitute for

five charges of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. Id. See also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22B (2016) ("Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse
with a child under 16, and compels such a child to submit by force and against his will or compels
such child to submit by threat of bodily injury .... ); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13B (2016)
("Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years, or by imprisonment in the
house of correction for not more than 21 years .... ).
16 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 185 (discussing judge's reasons for dismissing without
prejudice). The motion judge concluded that while an indictment generally may be solely based
on hearsay, this case constituted an "extraordinary circumstance." Id. Also, the judge ruled that,:
[I]n a case such as this, the exclusive use of hearsay in the presentation of the case to the
grand jury destroys the historical function of the grand jury in assessing the likelihood
of prosecutorial success and diminishes the protections that the grand jury is supposed
to afford to the innocent.
Id. at 186. Lastly, the motion judge suggested that a higher standard of evidence ought to be
required when charges of sexual assault arise because of the damage to one's reputation caused by
an indictment of this nature. Id. at 189. See also RAININ, Scope of the Problem: Statistics,RAINN
(2016), https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem (explaining that sexual assaults occur every
two minutes). Compare Patrick Witt, A Sexual HarassmentPolicy That Nearly Ruined My Life,
THE BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opiion/2014/11/03/sexualharassment-policy-that-nearly-ruined-life/hY3XrZrOdXjvX2SSvuciPN/story.html
(noting that
sexual harassment charges can ruin lives, creating a stigma); and Joe Gerard, Fame, Fortune and
Sexual Harassment: Don't Ruin Your Reputation, I-SIGHT CUSTOMER EXPRESSIONS (2016),
http://i-sight.com/resources/fame-forune-sexual-harassment/ (detailing all ways sexual assault
charges ruin reputations); with Madison Pauly, How the Stanford Sexual-Assault Case Could
Change the Legal Definition of Rape, MOTHER
JONES
(July
12,
2016)
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/stanford-rape-case-political-backlash-explained
(clarifying that stigmas are attached to victims not just oppressors); and KGO-TV, Brock Turner:
Member of Congress Read Victim Letter in Stanford Sex Assault Case, ABC 7 NEWS (June 15,
2016),
http://abc7news.com/news/members-of-congress-read-victim-letter-in-stanford-sexassault-case/1387032/ (elaborating that heavy stigmas are attached to sexual assault cases leading
to congressional action).
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direct testimony. 17 Following direct appellate review, the SIC reversed the
order of the Superior Court, reinstating the charges against Stevenson.' 8
I. THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF THE GRAND JURY
A grand jury has the dual function of determining the existence of
probable cause before a criminal defendant can be indicted with a crime and
to protect citizens against meritless criminal prosecutions. 9 Individuals
have the right to be secure from "public accusation of crime. ' 2 In the

17 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 185 (articulating reasons Stevenson filed motion to dismiss

indictments). The SJC recognizes this problem may become more "salient now that the Legislature
has eliminated the statute of limitations as to indictments and criminal complaints charging
violations of the statutes at issue here." Id. at 190; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 63 (2011) (lifting
statute of limitations for indictments to twenty-seven years after date of commission of offense).
The statue stating, in relevant part:
[A]n indictment for murder may be found at any time after the death of the person alleged
to have been murdered. An indictment or complaint for an offense set forth in section
13B, 13B 2, 13B3, 13F, 13L, 22A, 22B, 22C, 23, 23A, 23B, 24B or subsection (b) of
section 50 of chapter 265, for conspiracy to commit any of these offenses, as an
accessory thereto, or any 1 or more of them may be found and filed at any time after the
date of the commission of such offense; but any indictment or complaint found and filed
more than 27 years after the date of commission of such offense shall be supported by
independent evidence that corroborates the victim's allegation. Such independent
evidence shall be admissible during trial and shall not consist exclusively of the opinions
of mental health professionals. An indictment for an offense set forth in sections 22, 24
or subsection (a) of section 50 of chapter 265, or for conspiracy to commit either of these
offenses or as an accessory thereto or any 1 or more of them may be found and filed
within 15 years of the date of commission of such offense. An indictment for an offense
set forth in sections 17, 18, 19 and 21 of said chapter 265 or section 17 of chapter 272,
for conspiracy to commit any such crime, as an accessory thereto, or any 1 or more of
them may be found and filed within 10 years after the date of commission of such
offense. An indictment for any other crime shall be found and filed within 6 years after
such crime has been committed. Any period during which the defendant is not usually
and publicly a resident within the commonwealth shall be excluded in determining the
time limited. Notwithstanding the first paragraph, if a victim of a crime set forth in
section 13B, 13F, 13H, 22, 22A, 23, 24B, 26A or 50 of chapter 265, or section 1, 2, 3,
4, 4A, 4B, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 26, 28, 29A, 29B, 33, 34, 35 or 35A of chapter 272 is
under the age of 16 at the time the crime is committed, the period of limitation for
prosecution shall not commence until the victim has reached the age of 16 or the
violation is reported to a law enforcement agency, whichever occurs earlier.
Id.
18 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 191 (concluding hearsay testimony from investigating officers

was enough to enforce grounds of grand jury indictments).
19 See Lataille v. District Court of E. Hampden, 320 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Mass. 1979) (defining
constitutional authority of dual function of grand juries).
20 Jonesv. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344 (1857). Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the SJC noted:
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts, grand jury proceedings operate with
interference from a presiding judge; yet the right to a grand jury indictment
for state crimes is not guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 2'
Furthermore, any evidence that is presented to a grand jury must be sufficient
enough to establish probable cause that the defendant committed the alleged
22

crime.

II. HEARSAY AND GRAND JURIES
Grand juries are given "broad powers to 'inquire into all information
that might possibly bear on [their] investigation.' 23 This sweeping power is
what enables the grand jury to request the presentation of additional evidence
24
if it is uncertain about returning indictments based on hearsay testimony.
Further, grand juries can only hear evidence produced by the government.25
It is well-established in Massachusetts that hearsay evidence alone may
support an indictment in grand jury proceedings.26
Rules like the

The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusation of crime,
and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, before a probable cause is
established by the presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high offences,
is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of
English liberty.
Id.
21

See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) (defining functional independence of

grand juries); Commonwealthv. McCravy, 723 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Mass. 2000) (explaining right to
grand juries is not provided by United States Constitution); see also Jones, 74 Mass. at 342 (noting
importance of grand juries and right to be free from public accusation of crimes). Although grand
juries are not guaranteed by the United States Constitution, they are "one of the great securities of
private right, handed down to us as among the liberties and privileges which our ancestors enjoyed
at the time of their emigration, and claimed to hold and retain as their birthright." Id.
22 See Commonwealthv. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50, 58-59 (clarifying sufficient evidence must
be presented to establish defendant committed said crime). "Probable cause requires sufficient
facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed..
Id. at 59.
23 Commonwealthv. Williams, 790 N.E.2d 662,667 (Mass. 2003) (summarizing broad powers
of grand juries to inquire all information pertaining to relevant investigation).
24 See Commonwealth v. McNary, 140 N.E. 255, 256 (Mass. 1923) (clarifying abilities of
grand juries to request additional evidence or information before reaching conclusions); see also
Williams, 790 N.E.2d at 667 (stating ability of grand juries to request or inquire all information
bearing on their investigation).
25 See McNary, 140 N.E. at 256 (noting only government or prosecution brings about evidence
in grand jury proceedings).
26 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walczak, 979 N.E.2d 732, 760-61 (Mass. 2012) (Spina, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing grand jury functions and proceedings);
Commonwealth v. Washington W., 967 N.E.2d 615, 621 (Mass. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v.
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Massachusetts rule permitting the use of hearsay to obtain indictments
appears to prevail in every state that has considered the issue, except in those
states which possess specific statutory language dictates the forms of
evidence that may be received in a grand jury proceeding.2 7
Furthermore, hearsay testimony does not invalidate an indictment;
rather, a defendant must show that the testimony was so deceptive or
inaccurate that it affected the grand jury's deliberation on the indictment.28
The Commonwealth relies exclusively on the use of hearsay
testimony before grand juries because it can trigger grounds for dismissal of
an indictment under extraordinary circumstances.29 This means that
McGahee, 473 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1985)) ("[A] grand jury may rely on hearsay in
determining probable cause."); Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 466 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Mass. 1984)
("[A]n indictment may be based solely on hearsay."); Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 387 N.E.2d
1135, 1139 (Mass. 1979) ("[A]n indictment may stand which is based in part or altogether on
hearsay."); Commonwealthv. Gibson, 333 N.E.2d 400, 404-06 (Mass. 1975) (affirming denial of
motion to dismiss indictment because grand jury may indict based upon hearsay); Commonwealth
v. Woodward, 32 N.E. 939,940 (Mass. 1893) ("[I]nfinding indictments, grandjurors may actupon
their own knowledge, or upon the knowledge of one or more of their number."). The policy
allowing for grand jury indictments based solely upon hearsay evidence dates back more than a
century in Massachusetts. Id. at 939. Moreover, federal grand jury proceedings permit the use of
hearsay. Id. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (holding criminal
conviction can be sustained even if only hearsay evidence was presented to grand jury).
27 See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(r) ("Evidence which would be legally admissible at trial shall be
admissible before the grand jury."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.6(b) (1959) ("the grand jury shall not
receive any evidence except that which would be admissible over objection at the trial of a criminal
action"); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 442 (1928) ("A grand jury should receive only legal
evidence and such as is given by witnesses produced, or furnished by documents and other physical
evidence."); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.05, SUBD. (2016) ("Hearsay evidence offered only to lay the
foundation for [] admissibility."); NEv. REV. STAT. § 172.135(2) (1967) ("grand jury can receive
none but legal evidence ... to the exclusion of hearsay"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-11(A) (1953)
("The Rules of Evidence shall not apply to a grand jury proceeding."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §
190.30(1) (1970) ("the provisions of article sixty, governing rules of evidence and related matters
with respect to criminal proceedings in general, are, where appropriate, applicable to grand jury
proceedings."); OR. REV. STAT. § 132.320(1) (1973) ("for the purposes of indictment, the grand
jury shall receive no other evidence than such as might be given on the trial of the person charged");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-5-15 (1939) ("the rules of evidence shall apply to proceedings before
the grand jury.").
28 See People v. Holmes, 922 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (mentioning defendant
must show detectives testimony was inaccurate or deceptive). See also Commonwealth v.
Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d 184, 190 (Mass. 2016) (explaining that jurors could ask Detective Santon
questions throughout his testimony). The jurors inquired if they were presented with all the
evidence before they deliberated, and queried whether Detective Santon had experience with
interviewing victims who waited for a longer period of time before reporting. Id.
29 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 185 (discussing Superior Court's reliance on hearsay to dismiss
indictments); see also Commonwealth v. Gibson, 333 N.E.2d 400, 405 (Mass. 1975) (quoting
United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1973)) ("In the absence of some showing that
the integrity of grand jury proceedings has been impaired, an indictment even if based exclusively
on... [hearsay] testimony will not be overturned on appeal.").
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inadmissible evidence at trial is sufficient enough to support a grand jury
indictment; as such, an indictment based upon hearsay will stand. 0
Although a minority of circumstances exists where the SIC prefers direct
testimony before grand juries, indictments based on hearsay are widely

accepted as the prevailing majority rule. 3 '
In Stevenson, the judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
and invalidated the indictment in question because testimony by the lead
investigating officer was based on hearsay.3 2 Furthermore, the Superior
Court suggested that a "higher standard of evidence ought to be required
when charges of sexual assault are at issue because of the serious damage to
one's reputation caused by such an indictment."33 Paradoxically, the SIC
reinstated the indictment from the grand jury upon appeal, opining that a
grand jury must be "an informing and accusing body" whose charge is to
determine whether probable cause and reason exist and where probable cause
34
and reason support the notion that a crime was committed.
30

See Gibson, 333 N.E.2d at 402 (clarifying evidence not competent at trial is sufficient for

grand jury indictment despite hearsay evidence base); see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 8, at 17 (explaining SJC decision that hearsay is enough for grand jury indictment to be valid).
31 See, e.g, Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 188 (repeating admonition of sound policy for preference
of direct testimony); Pierre, 387 N.E.2d at 1139 (stating hearsay is not enough to justify dismissal
of indictment); Commonwealthv. McCarthy, 430 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 n.4 (Mass. 1982) (accepting
hearsay when grand jury only heard officer's testimony about victim's statement); Commonwealth
v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Mass. 1993) (classifying videotaped evidence as hearsay is
acceptable in grand jury proceedings); Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 605 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Mass.
1993) (reinforcing hearsay testimony is acceptable although better testimony is available for
presentation to grand juries); O'Dell, 466 N.E.2d at 828 n. 1 (emphasizing sound policy dictates
preference for use of direct testimony before grand juries).
32 See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 8, at 17-28 (arguing lack of extraordinary
circumstances based on hearsay in Stevenson). The motion judge officially allowed the motion
without prejudice, ruling:
[I]n a case such as this, the exclusive use of hearsay in the presentation of the case to the
grand jury destroys the historical function of the grand jury in assessing the likelihood
of prosecutorial success and diminishes the protections that the grand jury is supposed
to afford the innocent.
Id.at 17.
33 Memorandum of Decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Commonwealth v.
Stevenson, No. DUCV2014-00007, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 19, 2015).
34 Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190 (suggesting stigmas are attached with sexual assault charges so
higher standards should be used). The motion judge noted three reasons for his conclusion that the
use of hearsay was so pernicious that: (1) the investigative officer was able to consistently articulate
the facts "belying any potential contradictions or misstatements in the complainant's story"; (2) the
grand jury was "unable to observe the complainant's demeanor .. ";and (3) "presentment of the
case through one witness denied the defendant his opportunity to obtain pretrial discovery ....
"
thus allowing the Commonwealth to avoid the possibility of impeachment. Id. at 189. See also,
RAINN, supra note 16 (explaining that sexual assaults occur every two minutes). Compare Witt,
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The SIC concluded that the Stevenson case did not present any
circumstances qualifying as extraordinary so as to impair the integrity of the
grand jury proceedings, warranting a dismissal of the indictments.3 5 The
grand jury heard all information available to the police when the proceedings
commenced, and was able to make an informed decision.36 Furthermore, the
members of the grand jury had the opportunity to request the presentation of
further evidence if they were uncertain about the hearsay testimony on a case
that was fourteen years old.37
The SIC correctly reversed and remanded the indictment on the
charges of "Aggravated Rape of a Child with Force" and five charges of
"Indecent Assault and Battery on a Child under the Age of Fourteen" because
indictments based upon hearsay are admissible.38 The grand jury heard all
available information at the time of the proceedings, and rendered a decision
as such.39 The grand jury's broad powers allows its members to probe into
all information bearing on the investigation for which they are charged in
assisting. 40 If members of the grand jury were unclear in rendering a decision
on a fourteen-year-old case, they had the capability to request further

supra note 17 (noting that sexual harassment charges can ruin lives, creating a stigma); and Gerard,
supra note 16 (detailing all ways sexual assault charges ruin reputations); with Pauly, supra note
16 (clarifying stigmas are attached to victims not just oppressors); and KGO-TV, supra note 16
(elaborating that heavy stigmas are attached to sexual assault cases so Congress is taking action).
35 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 185. See also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 8, at
17 and accompanying text.
36 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190 (stating Detective Santon was able to respond to questions
posedbyjurors); Commonwealthv. McGahee, 473 N.E.2d 1077, 1080-81 (Mass. 1985) (reasoning
that grand jurors received sufficient amount of evidence).
37 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190-91 (displaying broad powers of grand jury by noting they
could request additional information); Commonwealthv. McNary, 140 N.E. 255, 256 (Mass. 1923)
(explaining if appearance of more witnesses than those produced then grand jury may require
testimony); see also Commonwealthv. St. Pierre, 387 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Mass. 1979) (providing
indictment based on double hearsay testimony is permissible in grand jury proceedings);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 790 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Mass. 2003) (stating grand juries may gather
all information bearing on their investigation).
38 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190 (explaining defendant's awareness of all hearsay against
him and cannot require prosecution to call witnesses). The record does reflect that the grand jury
asked extensive questions of Detective Santon and understood the limited nature of the evidence
they were receiving. Id.
39 See cases cited supra note 26; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13B (2008) (punishing
violators of assault and battery with prison time or sentencing in house of corrections); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 22B (2008) (forbidding rape of child during commission of certain offenses or by
use of force).
40 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190 (deciding infornation bearing on investigation essential in
cases fourteen years old).
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evidence. 4' The SJC noted that because the grand jury heard all evidence
and rendered a decision, the indictment was confirmed under MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 4(c). 42 Lastly, the SJC recommended that the Superior Court craft
a "model instruction for use by judges who are empaneling grand jurors" to
43
guide future cases, which could be used for any court system.
However, the SJC erred in noting no stigma is associated with sexual
assault charges.44 The motion judge suggested that a higher standard of
evidence is needed when charges of sexual assault are at issue due to the
45
sensitivity and potential reputational damages associated with the subject.

With a sexual assault occurring almost every two minutes, stigma and
reputational harm can be experienced by the accused and accusee; therefore,

a higher standard of evidence ought to be implemented for sexual assault
charges at grand jury proceedings.4 6
Exclusive reliance on the use of hearsay testimony before the grand

jury may be grounds for the dismissal of an indictment under extraordinary
circumstances. 47 The Stevenson case tasked the courts with weighing
whether an extraordinary circumstance can trigger an allegation and a
subsequent charge or charges many years after the alleged crime was
committed.48 Due to the elimination of limitations for indictments, the

41 See Williams, 790 N.E.2d at 667 (defining grand jury powers as broad, allowing inquiries
on their investigation); McCravy, 723 N.E.2d at 520 (explaining right to grand juries is not
guaranteed by United States Constitution).
42 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 191 (recognizing broad powers of grand jury by noting it could
request additional information); McNary, 140 N.E. at 256 (stipulating if other witnesses produced,
grand jury may require testimony).
43 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190 n.7 (describing inquiries jurors had about receiving all
evidence relevant to their investigation).
44 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 191 n.9 (recommending that uniform instructions should be
given to grand jurors at proceedings). The SJC further elaborated that the instructions should
inform the grand jurors that they may request additional evidence or witnesses if they find it
necessary when considering a case presented to them by the prosecutor. McNary, 140 N.E. at 256-

57.
45 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d. at 190 n.8 (discussing "stigma associated withbeing charged with
sexual assault violations").
46 See Commonwealthv. Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d 184, 189 (Mass. 2016) (discussing what factors
Superior Court motion judge factored in making informed decision). "The judge credited one
further factor that informed his decision suggesting that a higher standard of evidence ought to be
required when charges of sexual assault are at issue because of the serious damage to one's
reputation caused by such an indictment." Id.
47 See also RAINN, supra note 16 and accompanying text. Compare Witt, supra note 16 and
accompanying text; and Gerard, supra note 16 and accompanying text, with Pauly, supra note 17
and accompanying text, and KGO-TV, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 185 (explaining that reliance on extraordinary circumstances
when reaching indictment is grounds for dismissal); see also Commonwealthv. Gibson, 333 N.E.2d
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circumstance in question has since become more salient. 49 Merely filing
charges fourteen years after the alleged committance of a crime does not
constitute an "extraordinary circumstance," especially where statutory
language allows up to twenty-seven years to institute grand jury
proceedings.5 °
The court in Commonwealth v. Stevenson held that hearsay
testimony, in the context of sexual assault charges filed many years after the
alleged crime was committed, is not an "extraordinary circumstance." The
grand jury in question heard all available information at the time of the
proceedings, and was able to render an informed decision. Members of the
grand jury had the opportunity to request presentation of further evidence if
they were uncertain about hearsay testimony because of the age of the case.
Drawing on these conclusions, the SJC reinstated the grand jury indictment,
stating that the role of the grand jury is to act as "an informing and accusing
body" to determine whether there was probable cause for the existing crime.
As such, the SJC struck down the Superior Court motion judge's suggestion
that a "higher standard of evidence ought to be required when charges of
sexual assault are at issue because of the serious damage to one's reputation
caused by such an indictment," considering there is no stigma associated
with sexual assault charges and violations.5
Alexis Brewster

400,405-06 (Mass. 1975) (citing United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d408, 411 (5thCir. 1973)) (holding
evidence not accepted at trial ).
49 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 189 (accepting charges within statute of limitations on
indictments); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 63 (2011) (lifting statute of limitations as to
indictments).
50 See Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 190 (explaining sexual assault victim can now charge assaulter
for crime years after it occurred). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 63 (2016) (allowing
evidence of crime multiple years after it has occurred).
51 Stevenson, 50 N.E.3d at 189.

